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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by defendant Robert U. Syme, who 
owned and operated a number of individually incorporated 
ambulance companies which, according to the 31-count 
superseding indictment, fraudulently sought over- 
reimbursement through the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs. Syme was convicted on several counts of wire 
fraud, mail fraud, and False Claims Act violations, and on 
one count of making a false statement relating to a health 
care matter. Syme's corporate co-defendants were convicted 
on all counts and are not involved in this appeal. Each of 
the fraud and False Claims Act counts alleged that Syme 
engaged in two or more of the following forms of fraud when 
he billed the government for ambulance trips: (1) falsely 
identifying a Pennsylvania address for his companies and 
seeking reimbursement at the rate paid to Pennsylvania 
companies, when the claim should have been billed at the 
(lower) Delaware or Maryland rates; (2) falsely representing 
that ambulance transport was medically necessary; (3) 
providing false information about the destination of the 
ambulance trip; and (4) providing false information about 
the type of treatment that the patient being transported 
was going to receive. 
 
Syme raises several challenges to his convictions. The 
principal challenge is that the indictment alleged and the 
District Court instructed the jury on a theory of fraud that 
is invalid as a matter of law. More particularly, Syme 
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contends that the government's theory that he committed 
fraud by misrepresenting that Pennsylvania was the"home 
station" of his ambulance companies, thereby getting 
reimbursed at the Pennsylvania rate, is invalid as a matter 
of law because the term "home station" had not been 
authoritatively defined during the time covered in the 
indictment. We conclude, however, that this fraud theory is 
not legally invalid, but rather, at most, may have been 
unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Because 
each challenged count also rests on a fraud theory that 
Syme does not challenge on appeal, we must affirm the 
convictions that Syme challenges on this basis. See United 
States v. Griffin, 502 U.S. 46, 57-58 (1991). 
 
We will, however, vacate and remand for a new trial 
Syme's False Claims Act conviction on count 25 of the 
superseding indictment. Albeit quite inadvertently, the 
District Court committed plain error with respect to that 
count, constructively amending the indictment by 
instructing the jury on a fraud theory that was not alleged 
in the count. In noticing plain error in this case, we hold 
that constructive amendments, which are per se reversible 
under harmless error review, are presumptively prejudicial 
under plain error review. Because we find that the 
government failed to present sufficient evidence during the 
first trial for the jury to convict on the "medical necessity" 
theory on Count 25, the "medical necessity" theory must be 
removed from the scope of the new trial thereon. To retry 
count 25 based on that theory would violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 
 
Syme also attacks all counts of conviction on the grounds 
that the District Court erred in the admission of certain 
evidence. Primarily, he challenges the admissibility of the 
testimony of a physician expert witness on the grounds that 
it could not "assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Fed. R. Ev. 702. 
We disagree, concluding that his testimony that an 
ambulance trip is actually medically necessary is an issue 
on which the average juror could benefit from a physician's 
expert testimony. We reject Syme's other evidentiary 
objections summarily. See infra note 2. 
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Turning from the convictions to the sentence, we agree 
with Syme that the sentence imposed by the District Court 
needs be vacated because the District Court committed 
plain error in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause by 
applying the Sentencing Guidelines' enhancement for fraud 
committed by "sophisticated means," which was not 
included in the Guidelines until after Syme committed the 
offenses in this case. We will remand for resentencing on 
this count. We reject, however, Syme's claim that the 
restitution order that the District Court imposed on him 
violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). This 
claim presents a question of first impression in this Circuit, 
which we resolve by concluding that, because the statute 
under which the District Court sentenced Syme to pay 
restitution contains no maximum penalty, Apprendi does 
not apply. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
From 1987 through late 1996, Syme owned and operated 
an ambulance company called Medical Services Corps, Inc. 
("MSC"), which had its main office first in Stanton, 
Delaware, and after 1995, in Wilmington, Delaware. Syme 
created three corporate subsidiaries to MSC. In 1989, he 
founded NCC Transportation, Inc. ("NCC") and Elk 
Transportation, Inc. ("Elk"). In 1992 he created 
Independence EMS, Inc. ("Independence"). All three 
subsidiaries operated from MSC's Delaware offices and 
engaged in the business of providing ambulance 
transportation services. Ambulances from Syme's 
companies sometimes also operated in Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, and Maryland. Syme exercised day-to-day control 
over MSC and all of its subsidiaries, including oversight of 
the ambulance dispatch and billing operations. One of the 
mainstays of Syme's ambulance businesses was 
transporting patients to and from regularly scheduled 
medical treatments. For example, his companies had 
contracts with the Delaware State Hospital to transport 
patients to the hospital for treatment. 
 
The majority of the patients that Syme's companies 
transported were covered either by Medicare, the federally 
funded program that funds medical services for the elderly, 
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or by Medicaid, a similar program that funds services for 
low-income people. The Health Care Financing 
Administration ("HCFA"), a federal agency within the 
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), is 
responsible for coordinating and financing the 
reimbursement of health care service providers under the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs. During the period 
relevant to this case, HCFA contracted first with 
Pennsylvania Blue Shield and later with its subsidiary, Xact 
Medicare Services ("Xact"), to administer the 
reimbursement of Medicare claims. Xact was responsible 
for claims arising in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and 
Delaware, and processed the claims for Medicare 
reimbursement submitted by Syme's ambulance 
companies. 
 
Xact developed operational guidelines governing which 
claims would be reimbursed under Medicare consistent 
with HCFA policy memoranda. In order to get paid for 
transporting Medicare patients, ambulance companies were 
required to submit standard reimbursement requests to 
Xact with information about the patient, the purpose of the 
trip, and the starting point and destination. Xact would 
determine whether to reimburse an ambulance service for 
a trip depending on whether the trip met certain criteria. 
First, the ambulance trip had to be "medically necessary" 
as defined by Xact's guidelines. Second, the patient had to 
be transported for a treatment covered by Medicare's 
ambulance reimbursement guidelines. Third, the 
ambulance trip had to be to a covered destination. Certain 
destinations, such as hospitals, were covered by Xact's 
reimbursement program, while others, such as a dental 
offices, were not. 
 
Ambulance services were also required to record on their 
reimbursement forms a provider number that indicated the 
state in which their service was located. Most importantly, 
the rate of reimbursement that Medicare paid varied widely 
according to which state provider number the ambulance 
service used. The reimbursement rates for Pennsylvania 
ambulance services, for example, were almost twice as high 
as the rates for Delaware services. 
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Syme and his companies have long had a rocky 
relationship with HCFA and its subcontractors. In February 
1982, Xact's predecessor, Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 
became concerned that Delaware Medical Services, Inc. 
("DMS"), a separate company that Syme had formed around 
the same time as MSC, was filing duplicate claims for the 
same ambulance trip and billing at the higher Pennsylvania 
rate rather than at the Delaware rate. According to an 
affidavit by an employee in the HHS Office of the Inspector 
General, representatives from Pennsylvania Blue Shield 
spoke with Syme "in an attempt to educate [him] in the 
appropriate claim filing policies and procedures." Syme 
represented in this meeting that "he was inadequately 
reimbursed for ambulance service in Delaware." 
 
In 1987, the government filed a civil suit against Syme 
and DMS, alleging, among other things, that DMS had 
falsely filed claims for Delaware ambulance trips using a 
Pennsylvania provider number in order to get reimbursed at 
the higher Pennsylvania rate. Syme settled the suit for 
$4,000 in May 1992, but did not admit any wrongdoing. 
 
In April 1992, Donald Baxter, a Pennsylvania Blue Shield 
investigator, started looking into the location of MSC's three 
subsidiary companies. He visited the locations in 
Philadelphia that Syme had listed as the addresses for his 
three companies in the applications that he had submitted 
for Medicare provider numbers. At 4700 Cedar Avenue, the 
address listed on NCC's provider number application, 
Baxter found neither a garage, nor ambulances, but rather 
an apartment building. He also attempted to visit 3255 A 
Street, the address listed on Elk's provider number 
application, but found that the address did not exist. 
Finally, Baxter visited 3300 Fairmount Avenue, the address 
listed on Independence's application. At that address, he 
found a number of garages that appeared to be vacant. 
 
Baxter then contacted Syme to ask him where his 
companies' ambulances were located. Syme told him that 
two ambulances were housed at 3300 Fairmount Avenue at 
the time, but that no ambulances were housed at 3255 A 
Street. In a follow-up letter to Baxter, Syme wrote that Elk 
and NCC had moved from 3225 A Street to 3300 Fairmount 
Avenue about one year earlier, and that all of the 
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administrative offices and dispatching operations for all 
three of the subsidiaries had been moved to Stanton, 
Delaware. On April 13, 1992, after receiving the letter from 
Syme, Baxter returned to 3300 Fairmount Avenue. He 
visited the site twice, once at 12:30 a.m., and again from 
4:25 p.m. until approximately 4:45 p.m., but saw no 
activity either time. Before leaving the site, Baxter taped the 
garage doors so that he could tell if anyone opened them 
while he was away. When he returned three days later, the 
tape had not been disturbed. 
 
Baxter returned to 3300 Fairmount Avenue in July 1994 
along with Klaus Placke, an investigator from Xact, and 
found that the garages and attached office space appeared 
to be empty. Following their visit to 3300 Fairmount 
Avenue, the investigators went to see Syme at his office in 
Stanton, Delaware. They asked him where the ambulances 
for NCC and Elk were located, and he replied that they 
were still housed at 3300 Fairmount Avenue. When the 
investigators told him that they had just been to the 
location and that it had looked empty, Syme replied that he 
had moved most of his operation to Delaware, but that he 
still housed one of NCC's ambulances at the Fairmount 
Avenue location. He added that NCC's one Philadelphia- 
based ambulance was then in Delaware for servicing and 
he showed it to the investigators. The investigators asked 
Syme why the supposedly Philadelphia-based ambulance 
had Maryland tags and a Maryland certification sticker, but 
he could not explain the discrepancy. 
 
During the same visit, the investigators asked to see NCC 
and Elk's state licenses to operate ambulance services in 
Pennsylvania. Syme was unable to find the licenses, but 
asked the investigators to return the next day so that he 
could give them copies. When the investigators returned the 
next day, Syme told them that he had been mistaken, and 
that NCC and Elk were not licensed in Pennsylvania and 
consequently had no ambulances housed in Philadelphia. 
He said that Independence was licensed in Pennsylvania 
and operated one ambulance out of 3300 Fairmount 
Avenue. Following the visit, Placke, the Xact investigator, 
changed NCC and Elk's provider numbers to indicate that 
the two companies were Delaware providers that could be 
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reimbursed only at the Delaware rate. He left 
Independence's provider number unchanged, and 
Independence continued to bill at the Pennsylvania rate. 
 
The Pennsylvania state ambulance licensing authority 
was also investigating Syme's Philadelphia operations 
during the early- to mid-1990s. Independence originally 
received an ambulance license from Pennsylvania in 1992. 
In September 1993, however, Michael Tunney of the 
Philadelphia region of Pennsylvania's ambulance licensing 
authority, prompted by a call from his supervisor at the 
state licensing board, inspected Syme's purported 3300 
Fairmount Avenue location. Tunney saw no employees and 
no activity at the location. He knocked on a door located 
next to the garages, but received no response. 
 
Tunney also received applications signed by Syme for 
Pennsylvania ambulance licenses for NCC and Elk in 
September 1993. Each application listed 3300 Fairmount 
Avenue as a location out of which the company operated. 
Because he had visited the Philadelphia address only a few 
weeks earlier and found no activity, Tunney called Syme to 
inquire about the location that he had listed. Syme told him 
that there was not much activity at 3300 Fairmount 
Avenue. Tunney did not process the applications for NCC 
and Elk because, following his conversation with Syme, he 
had "a question in [his] mind about the veracity of the 
information in the application . . . as to whether or not 
[Syme] was really operating in Philadelphia." 
 
Tunney visited the 3300 Fairmount Avenue location 
again soon after February 1995, after receiving 
Independence's application for relicensing, which 
Pennsylvania requires ambulance companies to submit 
every three years. He found that the building located at that 
address appeared to be empty and received no response 
when he knocked. Tunney therefore denied Independence's 
application for relicensing. 
 
On March 10, 1998, a grand jury in the District of 
Delaware returned a 30-count indictment against Syme and 
his corporations, MSC, NCC, Elk, and Independence. The 
grand jury later returned a 31-count superseding 
indictment against the same defendants for offenses that 
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allegedly occurred between October 1993 and March 1997. 
Our references hereafter are to the superseding indictment. 
Syme was charged in all counts of the indictment. Counts 
1-4 allege mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 1341. The 
indictment alleges that for each count in this group, Syme 
engaged in a "scheme to defraud" the HCFA in at least two 
of the following ways: (1) by falsely identifying a 
Pennsylvania address for his companies and fraudulently 
seeking reimbursement at the higher Pennsylvania rate 
when the claims should have been billed at the Delaware or 
Maryland rates (the "Pennsylvania rate theory"); (2) by 
falsely representing that ambulance transport was 
medically necessary (the "medical necessity theory"); (3) by 
providing false information about the destination of the 
ambulance trip (the "destination theory"); and (4) by 
providing false information about the type of treatment that 
the patient being transported was receiving (the"treatment 
theory"). 
 
Counts 1-4 allege that Syme's scheme to defraud caused 
the HCFA to send him checks through the U.S. Mail on 
four separate occasions to reimburse his companies for the 
ambulance trips in question. Counts 5-9 allege wire fraud 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1343, pleading that Syme's 
companies electronically transmitted reimbursement 
requests to Pennsylvania Blue Shield that Syme knew 
contained false information. In each count, the indictment 
alleges two or more of the four theories of fraud described 
above. 
 
Counts 10-29 allege violations of the False Claims Act, 18 
U.S.C. S 287. The indictment divides these counts into 
three groups. Counts 10-12 apply to the Medicare 
payments that the defendants are alleged to have received 
fraudulently. Counts 13-17 apply to the reimbursement 
and copayments from Medicaid that the defendants are 
alleged to have fraudulently received. Counts 10-17 rely on 
all four theories of fraud: the Pennsylvania rate theory, the 
medical necessity theory, the destination theory, and the 
treatment theory. Counts 18-29 allege that Syme and his 
companies violated the False Claims Act by submitting 
duplicate bills for the same ambulance trip. In addition to 
the duplicate billing theory, each count in the 18-29 group 
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also alleges one or more of the four fraud theories described 
above. 
 
Count 30 alleges that Syme obstructed justice in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1505 by failing to respond properly 
to a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Office of the 
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human 
Services. Count 31 alleges that Syme made a false 
statement relating to a health care matter in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1035 when he prepared a letter concerning the 
application for a provider number by Lifestar Ambulance 
Services, the renamed company that he had sold to one of 
the former managers of MSC, in which he falsely stated 
that "Mr. Robert Syme has no role whatsoever in Lifestar," 
when in fact he remained active in managing the company. 
 
Following a seven-day trial, a jury convicted Syme on all 
of the mail and wire fraud counts (1-9), many of the False 
Claims Act counts (10-17, 19, 21, 23-25, 27, and 29), and 
the false statement count (31). Syme was acquitted on 
several of the False Claims Act counts (18, 20, 22, 26, and 
28) and on the obstruction of justice count (30). The 
corporate defendants were convicted on all counts. After the 
trial, all defendants moved for a new trial and for judgment 
of acquittal, which the District Court denied in a published 
opinion. See United States v. Med. Servs. Corps, Inc., 43 F. 
Supp. 2d 499 (D. Del. 1999). The Court sentenced Syme to 
a prison term of 37 months on each of the counts for which 
he was convicted, to be served concurrently, followed by 
three years of supervised release. In addition, the Court 
ordered Syme to pay special assessments totaling 
$1,750.00, and restitution to the HCFA of $100,000 (a 
$300,000 restitution order less a credit of $200,000). 
Following his sentencing, Syme filed a timely appeal.1 
Because the most difficult issue that Syme raises on appeal 
is the validity of the Pennsylvania rate theory, we begin our 
discussion with that issue. However, we will first dispose of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231, and 
we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742(a). 
 
                                10 
  
Syme's claims of improper admission of trial evidence in the 
margin.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Syme contends that the District Court committed plain error by 
admitting the testimony of two prosecution witnesses. He argues that the 
District Court should not have admitted the testimony of Joseph Leaser, 
M.D., a physician who had consulted for Xact and it predecessor 
company for twenty-four years, and who reviewed the medical records of 
several patients whom Syme had transported, or Craig Swartz, a 
Medicare fraud examiner employed by Xact. Syme did not object to 
Leaser's or Swartz's testimony in the District Court. Therefore, we review 
for plain error. See Fed. R. Ev. 103(d); see also infra note 4 (describing 
the plain error standard of review). 
 
He contends that Leaser's testimony should not have been admitted as 
expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because it could 
not "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue." Fed. R. Ev. 702. Leaser reviewed the files of several 
patients whose ambulance transportation, the government contended, 
was not medically necessary within the meaning of Xact's 
reimbursement policy. Syme submits that it was Xact's policy to leave to 
the ambulance provider the initial decision on whether ambulance 
transport was medically necessary. If the decision was Syme's, the 
argument continues, Leaser's testimony should not have been admitted 
as expert testimony under Rule 702 because it could not help the jury 
to determine whether Syme (who is not a physician) could have in good 
faith thought that ambulance transportation was medically necessary. 
As the government correctly points out, however, one of the facts that 
the prosecutor was required to prove was that "the trips actually were 
not medically necessary." We are satisfied that whether an ambulance 
trip is actually medically necessary is an issue on which the average 
juror could benefit from a physician's expert testimony. 
 
Syme also argues that Leaser's testimony should not have been 
admitted as expert testimony even on the issue of actual medical 
necessity. He contends that Leaser "rejected[Medicare's] standards 
insofar as they treated a patient's need for restraint as a presumptive 
justification for use of an ambulance." If the only relevant issue was 
whether the ambulance trips in question were actually medically 
necessary under the standards set forth in the Medicare regulations, 
Syme argues, Leaser had nothing relevant to say on that question. In his 
reply brief, Syme extends the argument even further and says that 
because Leaser rejected the Medicare standards he failed to satisfy the 
requirement of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 
(1993), that there be a valid connection between the expert testimony 
and the question at issue in the case. Id. at 591. 
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II. Validity of the Pennsylvania Rate Theory  
 
A. The Parties' Contentions 
 
The superseding indictment alleges that Syme and his 
companies fraudulently overcharged Medicare and Medicaid 
by submitting false bills that stated that the "home 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Syme does not specifically document his claim that Leaser disagreed 
with Medicare's treatment guidelines, but he alludes to the following 
exchange from Leaser's cross-examination: 
 
       Q. Do you agree with me that one of the hallmarks of medical 
       necessity is if a person, a patient needs restraint? 
 
       A. No, -- do you mean medical necessity for ambu lance transport? 
 
       Q. Yes. 
 
       A. No. I don't believe that you need to take a per son by ambulance 
       if they require restraint. 
 
       Q. We have had documents introduced here which say  if there is a 
       presumption of medical necessity and [sic] the patient needs 
       restraint. But you would disagree with that? 
 
       A. I would disagree with that, because you could t ake a patient in 
       a geriatric chair or a person in a wheelchair and restrain them in 
a 
       posey vest. 
 
This exchange may demonstrate that Leaser questioned the wisdom of 
one of Medicare's guidelines. However, it does not show, as Syme seems 
to suggest, that Leaser refused to evaluate the necessity of transporting 
patients by ambulance under Medicare's standards. The exchange seems 
especially weak evidence of Leaser's refusal to apply Medicare standards 
when considered in light of the fact that Leaser had been consulting for 
Xact or its predecessor company for around twenty-four years at the 
time he testified. Therefore, we think that the District Court did not 
violate Rule 702 by allowing Leaser's testimony. 
 
Syme also argues that Leaser's testimony was unfairly prejudicial 
when combined with the testimony of Craig Swartz, an Xact Medicare 
fraud examiner who testified as a prosecution witness. Syme contends 
that Swartz's testimony misled the jury into thinking that, if Leaser 
stated that a particular ambulance trip was not medically necessary, 
then the reimbursement form that Syme submitted should not have 
stated otherwise. We conclude that Swartz's testimony was not unduly 
confusing or prejudicial and that it was not error for the District Court 
to admit the testimony. 
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stations" of the ambulance companies were located in 
Philadelphia rather than in Delaware or Maryland, thereby 
getting reimbursed at the higher Pennsylvania rate. The 
indictment states that: 
 
       At all times material to this indictment, Medicare 
       authorized reimbursement for ambulance services at 
       pre-established rates based upon the home station of 
       the ambulance. If an ambulance's home station was in 
       Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the ambulance company 
       would be reimbursed at the rate for that part of 
       Pennsylvania. If the ambulance's home station was in 
       Delaware, the ambulance company would be 
       reimbursed at the Delaware rate, which was lower than 
       the rate for Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
 
The indictment then goes on to allege that Syme and all of 
his companies: 
 
       submit[ted] bills to Medicare for ambulance services 
       under a provider number which would be reimbursed 
       at a Pennsylvania rate (which was substantially higher 
       than the Maryland or Delaware rates) although the 
       home station for the ambulances were [sic] either in 
       Delaware or Maryland. Such bills should have been 
       submitted under a Delaware or Maryland provider 
       number, not under a Pennsylvania provider number. 
 
The District Court also used the term "home station" in its 
jury instructions. The Court instructed the jury that in 
order to convict on the mail or wire fraud counts, it had to 
find that the defendants "knowingly submitted each claim 
for reimbursement at a higher Pennsylvania rate, although 
the ambulances' home station was in Delaware." 3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In order to establish a violation of the mail or wire fraud statutes, a 
prosecutor must prove: (1) the existence of a scheme to defraud; (2) the 
participation by the defendant in the particular scheme with the specific 
intent to defraud; and (3) the use of the United States mail or of wire 
communications in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. See 18 U.S.C. 
SS 1341, 1343; United States v. Hannigan , 27 F.3d 890, 892 (3d Cir. 
1994). The elements for a False Claims Act violation are substantially 
similar. To establish a violation of the False Claims Act, the government 
must prove that: (1) the defendant presented a false or fraudulent claim 
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Syme bases his current challenge on the use of the term 
"home station." He contends that defects in the 
government's use of the term render the Pennsylvania rate 
theory both legally invalid and insufficiently supported by 
the evidence presented at trial. Syme submits three 
arguments attacking the legal validity of the Pennsylvania 
rate theory based on the use of the term "home station." 
First, he contends that neither the HCFA nor Xact had 
established a clear definition of the term "home station" 
during the period at issue in this case. Second, he asserts 
that even if "home station" had been defined, there was no 
official determination that an ambulance's "home station" 
would be the governing standard for determining 
reimbursement rates. Third, Syme argues that the 
application forms supplied by Xact, which he submitted in 
order to get Pennsylvania provider numbers for his 
ambulance companies, never asked for the companies' 
"home stations," but rather asked for their addresses. Syme 
contends that he therefore cannot be convicted of a scheme 
to defraud based on the fact that he misrepresented his 
companies' "home stations," because he never made any 
representations about their "home stations" at all. 
 
Finally, Syme asserts that for the same reasons that he 
claims the Pennsylvania rate theory of fraud is legally 
invalid, the evidence presented at trial is also insufficient 
factually to support his conviction based on the 
Pennsylvania rate theory. In addressing these arguments, 
we must of course first define our standard of review, which 
we set forth in the margin.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
against the United States; (2) the claim was presented to an agency or 
contractor of the United States; and (3) the defendant knew the claim 
was false or fraudulent. See 18 U.S.C. S 287; United States v. Thayer, 
201 F.3d 214, 222-23 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Okoronkwo, 
46 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 1995)). In this case, the theory that Syme 
misrepresented the "home stations" of his ambulance companies goes to 
both the existence of a "scheme to defraud" (in the case of the mail and 
wire fraud counts) and the "false or fraudulent claim against the United 
States" (in the case of the False Claims Act counts); it also encompasses 
Syme's intent. 
 
4. Syme contends that his trial counsel preserved his argument that the 
Pennsylvania rate theory is invalid as a matter of law, and that therefore 
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We agree with Syme that the evidence presented at trial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
we should review this claim under the harmless error standard of review 
rather than the plain error standard. The government urges us to apply 
the latter standard. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the 
government. 
 
At the close of the government's case, Syme moved generally to dismiss 
all the counts for failure to state a prima facie case. He later raised a 
more specific claim in his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, arguing that 
Xact's policies could not serve as the basis for a conviction because they 
did not have the force of law. Syme noted that "[t]he basis of the 
Government's claim nullifying the use of the Pennsylvania provider 
number was that the policy definitions offered by Xact, or its 
predecessor, Blue Shield, represented the de jure law of the land," and 
that "[t]he foundation of the prosecution is that the defendants violated 
a policy statement of a private or public non-governmental corporation 
and not that the defendants violated federal law." Essentially, Syme 
argued: (1) that Xact's reimbursement guidelines did not have the force 
of federal laws or regulations; and (2) that the scheme to defraud that is 
predicate to a federal mail or wire fraud conviction must itself be a 
violation of federal law. 
 
The District Court addressed these issues in an opinion accompanying 
the order denying the defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and 
for New Trial. There, the Court concluded that it did not matter that Xact 
and Medicare did not have the authority to make policy statements with 
the force of law because "the `scheme to defraud' itself need not violate 
federal law." United States v. Med. Serv. Corps, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 499, 
501 (D. Del. 1999). The arguments that Syme presented to the District 
Court were not sufficiently similar to the one that he now makes before 
this court to justify applying harmless error review. Syme contends on 
appeal not that the policies of Xact are insufficient to define Syme's 
"scheme to defraud" because they do not have the force of federal law, 
but rather that the fraud that the government identified -- falsifying the 
"home station" of the ambulances -- could not have occurred because 
"home station" was not authoritatively defined during the relevant 
period. Syme did not make this argument in the District Court. We will 
therefore review Syme's claim for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 
Under the plain error standard, a reviewing court may reverse the 
district court "only if [it] finds that (1) an error was committed; (2) 
the 
error was plain, that is, `clear' and `obvious;' and (3) the error 
`affected 
[the defendant's] substantial rights.' " United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 
758, 762 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
734 (1993)). "If a forfeited error is `plain' and `affects substantial 
rights,' 
a Court of Appeals `has the authority to order the correction, but is not 
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shows little beyond the fact that there was a general 
understanding in the ambulance community of the 
definition of the term "home station." The earliest document 
that the prosecution presented that defines "home station" 
in the reimbursement context is a February 2, 1995 letter 
from Xact to an ambulance provider that defines a 
transporting vehicle's "home station" as its"point of 
departure." Testimony presented at trial also shows that 
there was a debate within the ambulance community 
during the time relevant to this case as to whether"home 
station" was the correct reimbursement standard. 
 
Syme is also correct that none of the forms that he 
completed in order to get Pennsylvania provider numbers 
asked for the "home stations" of his ambulance companies. 
However, two of the provider number applications asked for 
both an "address" and a "mailing address;" another form 
asked for both a "physical location" and a"mailing 
address." Syme supplied Philadelphia addresses as the 
"address" and "physical location" as well as the "mailing 
addresses" on these forms. 
 
The government counters that "home station" was 
sufficiently defined and understood to be the governing 
reimbursement standard during the time relevant to the 
case. Alternatively, the government argues that Syme's 
behavior would constitute fraud under any of the meanings 
of "home station" or alternative reimbursement standards 
that may have been debated during the relevant period. The 
government also contends that it demonstrated a pattern of 
deception that is sufficient to demonstrate Syme's intent to 
defraud Medicare and Medicaid. 
 
B. Griffin and Yates 
 
As we noted above, the prosecution has presented 
alternative theories of guilt to support each count in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
required to do so.' The Court should exercise its discretion to order such 
a correction only if the error, `seriously affects the fairness, 
integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " United States v. Stevens, 
223 
F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734) (internal 
citations omitted). The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that 
"plain error" occurred. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. 
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indictment. Each count rests on two or more of the four 
main theories that the government presented: the 
Pennsylvania rate theory, the medical necessity theory, the 
destination theory, and the treatment theory. See supra at 
9. When a criminal defendant appeals a conviction in which 
the prosecution presented more than one theory of guilt 
and the jury returned a general verdict, we apply the 
holding of Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991). 
Griffin restated the longstanding rule that if the evidence is 
insufficient to support a conviction on one alternative 
theory in a count but sufficient to convict on another 
alternative theory that was charged to the jury in the same 
count, then a reviewing court should assume that the jury 
convicted on the factually sufficient theory and should let 
the jury verdict stand. Id. at 49-50. However, under Griffin, 
if one of two or more alternative theories supporting a 
count of conviction is either (1) unconstitutional, or (2) 
legally invalid, then the reviewing court should vacate the 
jury verdict and remand for a new trial without the invalid 
or unconstitutional theory. Id. at 56 (citing Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-68 (1930) (reversing a 
conviction where one of the alternative guilt theories was 
unconstitutional), and Yates v. United States , 354 U.S. 298, 
312 (1957) (reversing a conviction where one of the possible 
grounds was legally invalid because it was time-barred)). 
 
The rationale for this distinction is that a jury is 
presumed to be able to distinguish factually sufficient 
evidence from factually insufficient evidence. That function 
is central to its role as fact finder. The jury is not 
presumed, however, to be able to distinguish accurate 
statements of law from inaccurate statements. Id. at 59; 
Tenner v. Gilmore, 184 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1999). And 
Griffin made it clear that claims regarding the insufficiency 
of evidence do not fall into the categories of a legally invalid 
or an unconstitutional basis for conviction. The Court 
explained: 
 
       In one sense "legal error" includes inadequacy of 
       evidence -- namely, when the phrase is used as a term 
       of art to designate those mistakes that it is the 
       business of judges (in jury cases) and of appellate 
       courts to identify and correct. In this sense "legal error" 
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       occurs when a jury, properly instructed as to the law, 
       convicts on the basis of evidence that no reasonable 
       person could regard as sufficient. But in another sense 
       -- a more natural and less artful sense -- the term 
       "legal error" means a mistake about the law, as 
       opposed to a mistake concerning the weight or the 
       factual import of the evidence . . . . [W]e are using 
       "legal error" in the latter sense. 
 
502 U.S. at 58-59. The question of which side of Griffin's 
line the present challenge to the Pennsylvania rate theory 
falls -- whether it is a claim about the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented on this theory, or (as Syme contends) 
an argument that the theory is legally invalid (he does not 
argue that it is unconstitutional) -- is dispositive of Syme's 
challenge to the theory as a basis for conviction. If we find 
that the Pennsylvania rate theory was, at most, 
unsupported by the facts presented at trial, then we will let 
the challenged counts of conviction stand, because each 
one rests on at least one other fraud theory that Syme does 
not challenge. If we find that the Pennsylvania rate theory, 
as it was alleged in the indictment and charged to the jury, 
constituted an error of law, then we must reverse Syme's 
conviction on the counts in which the theory was alleged 
and remand these counts for a new trial. 
 
A theory upon which a criminal charge rests is legally 
invalid under Griffin if the indictment or the district court's 
jury instructions are based on an erroneous interpretation 
of law or contain a mistaken description of the law. This 
"invalid legal theory" exception to the longstanding rule that 
general verdicts will stand even if one of the possible 
grounds for conviction was unsupported by the evidence, 
comes from Griffin's attempt to rationalize Yates v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), with the bulk of the Court's 
precedents. Prior to Yates, the only exception that the 
Court had applied to the rule of presuming that general 
verdicts rest on permissible grounds was that, when"any of 
the [grounds] in question [was] invalid under the Federal 
Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld." Stromberg, 
283 U.S. at 368. The Court applied this exception in many 
cases involving "general-verdict convictions that may have 
rested on an unconstitutional ground." Griffin, 502 U.S. at 
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55 (listing cases). In Yates, the Court extended the 
exception to cover grounds that were not unconstitutional, 
but rather were legally invalid. Yates held that the statute 
of limitations had already run on the charge that the 
defendants had "cause[d] to be organized units of the 
[Communist] Party." 354 U.S. at 302. This"organizing" 
offense was one of two theories that were the basis for a 
conspiracy charge. Id. The question whether the statute of 
limitations had run turned on the meaning of the statutory 
term "to organize." Id. at 303-304. The lower courts had 
construed the term "to organize" to "connote[ ] a continuing 
process which goes on throughout the life of an 
organization," but the Supreme Court rejected this 
definition, finding that "to organize" meant"to enter[ ] into 
the creation of a new organization" Id. at 310. 
 
Because the Supreme Court held that the term "organize" 
referred to the initial establishment of the Communist 
Party, and it was undisputed that the three-year statute of 
limitations had run between the time the Communist Party 
was initially organized and when the defendants were 
indicted, it held that the "organizing" charge was time- 
barred. Because it was "impossible to tell which ground the 
jury selected," either the "organizing" charge, or the 
alternative charge, the Court set aside the jury verdict and 
remanded for a new trial. Id. at 312. It did so, however, 
based on a finding that the lower courts had erred on a 
purely legal question, i.e., the construction of a statutory 
term. 
 
There does not appear to have been any dispute in Yates 
over the factual issue of when the Communist Party was 
initially organized. It was not as if the prosecution in that 
case simply failed to present sufficient evidence that the 
establishment of the Communist Party took place within 
three years prior to the indictment. If that were the case, 
then the jury would have been capable of determining that 
the facts were insufficient to show that the statute of 
limitations had not run and the Court would have 
presumed that the jury rested its general verdict on one of 
the factually supported grounds. However, because the 
lower court misinterpreted the meaning of the statutory 
term "to organize," erroneously permitting the"organizing" 
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charge to go to the jury, the jury was faced with a potential 
ground for conviction that was based on an invalid 
interpretation of the statute. Because the jury is not 
assumed to be able to distinguish between correct and 
incorrect legal interpretations, the Yates Court reversed the 
jury's general-verdict conviction. 
 
Griffin, in addition to referencing a claim that was time 
barred as an example of a legally inadequate ground for 
conviction, also cited the example of a theory of conviction 
that "fails to come within the statutory definition of a 
crime." 502 U.S. at 59. Again, this situation presents a 
strictly legal question -- the interpretation of whether the 
scope of a statutory definition of a crime extends to acts 
alleged in an indictment. 
 
C. Analysis 
 
In the present case, neither the indictment nor the 
District Court's instructions to the jury relied on erroneous 
interpretations of the law or contained mistaken 
descriptions of the relevant legal standards regarding the 
Pennsylvania rate theory of fraud as an element of Syme's 
fraud and False Claims Act charges. The indictment alleges 
that Syme's misrepresentation of his companies' home 
stations was a "scheme to defraud" within the meaning of 
the mail and wire fraud statutes, and a "false or fraudulent 
claim" under the False Claims Act, and the prosecution 
undertook to demonstrate the existence of that scheme and 
Syme's specific intent to engage in the scheme. See supra 
note 3 (listing the elements of mail and wire fraud and 
False Claim Act violations). Concomitantly, the District 
Court instructed the jury that in order to convict Syme for 
mail or wire fraud, the prosecution had to demonstrate that 
Syme "knowingly submitted each claim for reimbursement 
at a higher Pennsylvania rate, although the ambulances' 
home station was in Delaware." 
 
The "home station" theory of fraud on which the District 
Court instructed the jury certainly falls within the scope of 
the fraud statutes and the False Claims Act. To prove the 
existence of this scheme and Syme's intent to engage in the 
scheme, the government needed to demonstrate that a 
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definition of the term "home station" existed and that Syme 
was aware of the meaning of "home station" when he 
submitted his claims for reimbursement from Medicare and 
Medicaid using a Pennsylvania provider number. But even 
if there was no HCFA regulation or written instruction from 
Xact on the definition of "home station," and no clear 
indication that "home station" was the appropriate 
standard for reimbursement, the prosecution could still 
have demonstrated that Syme knew that this was the 
standard that Xact wanted ambulance companies to apply 
and that he knowingly used a Pennsylvania provider 
number in order to get paid at a higher rate. 
 
The meaning of the term "home station" and Syme's 
intent with respect to falsifying the "home station" of his 
ambulance companies was an issue on which both sides 
focused at trial. The government presented witnesses to 
attempt to show both (1) that "home station" had a 
generally recognized meaning during the times relevant to 
this case; and (2) that Syme understood the meaning of the 
term "home station." For example, the prosecution 
presented testimony from Jill Shaffer, a policy coordinator 
from Xact, that from 1990-95 "the home station 
requirement was that [Xact] reimbursed an ambulance 
company based on where [its] ambulance vehicles were 
garaged or housed." On cross examination, however, 
Shaffer admitted that the definition that she provided for 
"home station" came from a section of the Medicare manual 
defining "carrier jurisdiction," which referred to the 
insurance company with jurisdiction over processing a 
claim. 
 
Similarly, government witness Patrick Kennedy, the 
founder of the Ambulance Association of Pennsylvania, also 
testified that there was an understanding in the ambulance 
industry that "home station" meant "where your major 
business center would be," i.e., "where your major offices 
are . . . where your billing center is . . . [and] [m]ost 
importantly, where your communication center is." 
However, on cross-examination, Kennedy admitted that 
during the times relevant to this case, there was no written 
definition of "home station" as it relates to reimbursement 
rates. Prosecution witnesses also testified that Syme knew 
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of the different rates paid to Pennsylvania and Delaware 
providers and had complained that they were unfair, and 
that Xact officials had met with Syme to instruct him on 
the proper practices for submitting reimbursement claims. 
Thus, the questions whether "home station" had a 
meaning, and whether Syme knew that meaning, were 
highly disputed issues of fact in this trial, and were 
presented to the jury as such. 
 
Because the District Court correctly instructed the jury 
that it must find that Syme knowingly engaged in a scheme 
to defraud (in the case of the fraud counts) or made a false 
claim (in the case of the false claims counts), and because 
the jury was presented with conflicting testimony about 
whether the term "home station" had a meaning that Syme 
was aware of, we presume under Griffin that the jury 
focused on and was able to decide this disputed factual 
issue. There was a factual dispute regarding the term 
"home station," which the jury was competent to resolve. 
Under Griffin, we will presume that the jury did resolve this 
factual dispute, and that it relied on the Pennsylvania rate 
theory only if it found that the government presented 
sufficient evidence that the term "home station" had a 
meaning that Syme knew.5 
 
We conclude that, while the government simply may have 
failed to present sufficient evidence on the definition of the 
term "home station" to make out the elements of the fraud 
and False Claims Act charges, neither the indictment nor 
the District Court's instructions contained a "mistake about 
the law" regarding the Pennsylvania rate theory that, under 
Griffin, would require reversing the counts in question. 502 
U.S. at 59. Whether the government succeeded in 
presenting sufficient evidence so that a jury could have 
convicted Syme beyond a reasonable doubt is a question we 
need not reach, because even assuming that the evidence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In contrast, the jury in Yates could not have been presumed to have 
focused on the legal issue of the proper interpretation of the statutory 
term "to organize." This legal issue was not presented to the jury, and at 
all events was ultimately a question for the court instead of the jury. 
Similarly, a jury cannot be presumed to distinguish a constitutional 
ground for conviction from an unconstitutional one. 
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presented was insufficient to convict Syme on the 
Pennsylvania rate theory, Griffin instructs that we should 
presume that the jury relied on an alternative theory of 
guilt within the same count that is both legally valid and 
supported by sufficient evidence. Because Syme leaves 
unchallenged at least one of the fraud theories charged in 
each fraud and False Claims Act count for which he was 
convicted, we must uphold the jury verdict on each of these 
counts. 
 
Because we will not remand these counts for a new trial 
(except for count 25, which we will remand because the 
District Court constructively amended it, see infra Part III), 
we need not reach Syme's challenges to the factual 
sufficiency of the medical necessity, destination, and 
treatment theories of fraud, which he challenges for some 
of the counts for which he was convicted. If we were to 
vacate and remand any other counts for a new trial, then 
we would need to evaluate each challenged theory of guilt 
to determine whether the evidence presented at the first 
trial was sufficient. If we found that it was not sufficient, 
then we would be required to remove that theory from the 
scope of the new trial. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 
1, 17-18 (1978); see also infra Section III.D. However, 
because Syme leaves unchallenged at least one alternative 
theory of guilt on each count of conviction, we must affirm 
those counts and need not evaluate the evidentiary 
sufficiency on the alternative theories of guilt that Syme 
does challenge. We address below Syme's challenge to the 
evidentiary sufficiency of the "medical necessity" theory in 
count 25. See infra Section III.D. 
 
III. Constructive Amendment to Counts 18-29  
 
Syme contends that the District Court erred by 
instructing the jury on the Pennsylvania rate theory of 
fraud for counts 18-29, even though the indictment does 
not allege the theory in those counts. Syme did not raise 
this argument in the District Court and we therefore apply 
the plain error standard of review. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(b); see also supra note 4. 
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A. Did the District Court Err by Constructively 
Amending the Indictment? 
 
A constructive amendment occurs where a defendant is 
deprived of his "substantial right to be tried only on charges 
presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury." 
United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 140 (1985) (quoting 
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). A constructive amendment to the 
indictment constitutes "a per se violation of the fifth 
amendment's grand jury clause." United States v. Castro, 
776 F.2d 1118, 1121-22 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
In their text, counts 18-29 of the superseding indictment 
charge Syme under three alternative theories of fraud: (1) 
that he submitted Medicare forms indicating that 
ambulance trips were medically necessary when they were 
not ("medical necessity"); (2) that he falsified the description 
of the treatment, service, or destination of the ambulance 
trip ("treatment, service, or destination"); and (3) that he 
submitted duplicate bills for single ambulance trips, one 
using a Delaware ambulance provider number, and one 
using a Pennsylvania ambulance provider number 
("duplicate billing"). The text of the indictment for counts 
18-29 does not specifically charge Syme under the 
Pennsylvania rate theory of fraud. However, a chart 
accompanying these counts, which lists the various 
theories supporting each charge, does list the Pennsylvania 
rate theory in the sections for counts 19, 21, 23, 24, 27, 
and 29. The chart appeared in the superseding indictment 
as follows: 
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Although the Pennsylvania rate theory was neither 
mentioned in the text of the indictment, nor listed in the 
accompanying chart for several of the counts in the 18-29 
group, the District Court instructed the jury that it could 
convict on all of the counts in this group based on the 
Pennsylvania rate theory. In its jury instructions, the Court 
stated: 
 
       The next criminal act that has been charged is false 
       claims. Counts 10 through 29 of the indictment charge 
       that the defendants did make and present and caused 
       to be made and presented to the Health Care Financing 
       Administration, . . . claims for services provided to 
       Medicare and/or Medicaid patients, the defendants 
       knowing the claims to be false and fraudulent, which 
       is prohibited by federal law. 
 
       The indictment charges that defendants falsely 
       submitted bills that were not medically necessary and 
       were not for covered services, and that bills were 
       improperly submitted at the higher Pennsylvania rate . 
 
(emphasis added). The District Court repeated its erroneous 
instruction on the Pennsylvania rate theory in its response 
to the following question from the deliberating jury (which 
references the abbreviations for the government's different 
theories of fraud in the case, explained in the margin)6: 
 
       First let me read the question. The question says: 
       "Must we find all elements of the false statement 
       proven?" Then, there is parentheses, "(i.e., PA, MN, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The superseding indictment defines the abbreviations that the 
prosecution and the jury used to refer to the different theories of fraud 
presented. "PA" refers to the scheme whereby Syme "would submit bills 
. . . for transportation services billed at the Pennsylvania rate instead 
of 
the Delaware or Maryland rate." "MN" means a scheme in which the 
defendants "intentionally falsely represent[ed] that the [ambulance] 
transportation was medically necessary." "Dest." refers to the practice of 
"intentionally . . . send[ing] false and misleading information concerning 
the destination" of the ambulance trip. And finally, "Treat." means 
"intentionally transmit[ting] false and misleading information concerning 
the . . . reason for the transportation," i.e., the medical treatment 
sought. 
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       treat., dest.)," close parens, "to render a verdict on each 
       count, or would only one element suffice?" 
 
       The first part of my answer is this: In your 
       deliberations, to render a verdict on the false statement 
       counts, you must find that the government has proven 
       beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime 
       of making a false statement. And in the instructions I 
       provided you, I gave you the law of what the elements 
       are for the crime of false statement. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Now, in the question, the second part of my answer is, 
       when you refer to items such as "PA," "MN," "Treat." 
       and "Dest." as elements, I interpret your question to 
       mean entries on the statements. In order to find on an 
       entry, you would only have to find one of the entries 
       was proven to be false beyond a reasonable doubt, as 
       long as all the other elements were proven to your 
       satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
       So I answer you in two parts. Using the word 
       "element," all elements of the crime have to be proven 
       beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the elements is 
       there has to be a false entry. It only has to be proven 
       beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the entries 
       entered meets all of the elements. 
 
The government concedes that the District Court 
"committed error in its instructions to the jury on Counts 
18, 20, 22, 25, 26 and 28" because the sections of the 
indictment corresponding to these counts do not reference 
the Pennsylvania rate theory. As to the remaining counts in 
the 18-29 group, the government argues that the District 
Court did not constructively amend the indictment because 
the Pennsylvania rate theory was alleged in the indictment 
for these counts. The government relies on the chart that 
was included in the indictment. See supra at 25. The chart 
lists the various charges, and the theories on which each is 
based. Each horizontal row of the chart represents a 
different count of the indictment. Each vertical column in 
the chart has a heading telling which information 
corresponds to which count (e.g., "Billing Date" or "Money 
Billed"). One heading labeled "False State." refers to the 
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category of statement or statements that the count alleges 
Syme to have falsely made on his reimbursement forms. 
This box contains abbreviations that correspond with the 
different categories of information that the government 
charged Syme with falsifying. 
 
The abbreviation "PA" appears in the "False State." 
column for the rows corresponding to counts 19, 21, 23, 
24, 27, and 29. As we explained above, see supra note 6, 
"PA" is defined earlier in the indictment to mean 
"submit[ting] bills . . . for transportation services billed at 
the Pennsylvania rate instead of the Delaware or Maryland 
rate." Therefore, argues the government, Syme was 
effectively indicted in these counts on the Pennsylvania rate 
theory and the District Court therefore did not amend these 
counts in its jury instructions or its answer to the jury's 
question. Syme responds that including the term"PA" in 
the chart corresponding to the counts in question was 
alone insufficient when the theory was not also described in 
the text of the indictment that corresponded to these 
counts. It is particularly confusing, argues Syme, because 
when "the same `PA' abbreviation was used in a chart 
pertaining to the other fraud and false claims counts, it was 
used together with charging language." 
 
Although the indictment is below the level of clarity to 
which prosecutors should aspire, we agree with the 
government that the chart sufficiently alleges the 
Pennsylvania rate theory for counts 19, 21, 23, 24, 27, and 
29 for the purpose of determining whether there has been 
a constructive amendment to the indictment. There is 
nothing impermissible about setting out allegations in an 
indictment by a chart as long as the terms used in the 
chart are clearly defined, as they were here. Cf. United 
States v. Heath, 122 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that it was not error for a sentencing court to"consider all 
of the acts charged in the indictment" including a chart 
that was "incorporated by reference" in one of the counts). 
Indeed, Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 recommends the 
value of presenting evidence to a jury in the form of a chart 
when doing so would increase the clarity of presentation. In 
sum, while the use of charts in this indictment is somewhat 
inconsistent internally, we find that the chart 
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accompanying counts 19, 21, 23, 24, 27, and 29 makes it 
sufficiently clear that those counts alleged the Pennsylvania 
rate theory. Therefore, we find that the District Court erred 
by constructively amending the indictment only as to 
counts 18, 20, 22, 25, 26 and 28. 
 
B. Was the Error Clear or Obvious?  
 
The government concedes that the District Court's error 
was clear with respect to counts 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, and 28. 
Cases from the Supreme Court and this court hold that it 
violates the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
when a court instructs a jury on a ground for conviction 
that is not fully contained in the indictment. See Miller, 471 
U.S. at 140; Castro, 776 F.2d at 1121-22. Nowhere in 
counts 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, or 28, including the chart, does 
the indictment allege the Pennsylvania rate theory. 
Therefore, we agree that it was clear error for the District 
Court to instruct the jury on the Pennsylvania rate theory 
for those counts. 
 
C. Did the Error Affect Syme's Substantial Rights? 
 
Under plain error review, a defendant must also show 
that the clear error " `affected [the defendant's] substantial 
rights.' " United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 762 (3d Cir. 
2001) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 
(1993)). "In most cases, the language about affecting 
substantial rights `means that the error must have been 
prejudicial,' that is, `[i]t must have affected the outcome of 
the district court proceedings.' " United States v. Stevens, 
223 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Olano , 507 U.S. 
at 734). Syme was found not guilty on counts 18, 20, 22, 
26, and 28. Therefore, the constructive amendment of these 
counts obviously did not affect his substantial rights. That 
leaves only the question whether the constructive 
amendment of count 25 affected Syme's substantial rights. 
 
Syme does not attempt to demonstrate that the 
constructive amendment to count 25 was prejudicial. 
Instead, he submits that our holding in United States v. 
Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1121-22 (3d Cir. 1985), that a 
constructive amendment is per se reversible error, compels 
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us to find that a constructive amendment per se affects a 
defendant's substantial rights under plain error analysis. 
The government argues the opposite, maintaining that 
under plain error review, it is the defendant's burden to 
show that the constructive amendment was prejudicial. 
Neither Castro nor United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723 
(3d Cir. 1974), the Third Circuit case on which Castro relies 
for the proposition that a constructive amendment is per se 
reversible, specify whether the per se rule that they cite 
applies under both harmless error and plain error review. 
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), the U.S. 
Supreme Court opinion that both Castro and Somers cite as 
authority to support the per se rule, reviewed a 
constructive amendment to which the defendant raised an 
objection in the district court, and thus does not 
necessarily extend the per se rule to the plain error context. 
See id. at 214. 
 
However, even if the general statements from Castro and 
Somers must be read to extend to the plain error context, 
it is uncertain whether this application of the per se rule 
has survived Olano, which recognized broader discretion for 
appellate courts exercising plain error review. See United 
States v. Dipento, 242 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that it is uncertain whether the Ninth Circuit's per 
se reversal rule for constructive amendments under plain 
error review has survived Olano, but declining to decide). 
Several courts of appeals have considered the question 
whether a constructive amendment is per se reversible 
under the plain error standard, but the circuits are divided 
and the resulting law is checkered, as explained in the 
margin.7 However, the question whether the per se reversal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, has held that because a 
constructive amendment is per se error in the harmless error context, it 
also per se satisfies the "affects substantial rights" prong of the plain 
error test. See United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 714 (4th Cir. 
1994) 
(en banc). 
 
In the Ninth Circuit, "it was established . . .[prior to Olano] that a 
constructive amendment required reversal, even under plain error 
review." United States v. Dipento, 242 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2001). 
The Ninth Circuit has twice faced the question whether this rule has 
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rule of Castro and Somers applies in the context of plain 
error review appears to be one of first impression for us. 
 
As noted above, Olano stated that in order for an error to 
"affect substantial rights" under the plain error test, the 
defendant usually must show that the error was 
"prejudicial," that is that it "affected the outcome of the 
district court proceedings." 507 U.S. at 734. However, as 
we recently recognized in United States v. Adams , 252 F.3d 
276 (3d Cir. 2001), "the Supreme Court has cautioned that 
some errors to which no objection was made should be 
`presumed prejudicial' if the defendant cannot make a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
survived Olano, but declined to decide it, because it found that the error 
was prejudicial, and thus that it satisfied the plain error test. See id.; 
United States v. Shipsey, 190 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
The Seventh Circuit recently purported to decline to reach the question 
whether a constructive amendment is per se reversible in the plain error 
context, but in an earlier case it seems to have reached the question and 
concluded that a defendant must show prejudice to succeed in a plain 
error challenge to a constructive amendment. Compare United States v. 
Cusimano, 148 F.3d 824, 828 n.3 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the court 
"need not reach the issue of whether constructive amendments of 
indictments are always reversible because we conclude no amendment 
occurred"), with United States v. Remsza, 77 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 
1996) (applying the plain error framework's prejudice test to a 
constructive amendment and declining to reverse the conviction because 
the defendant "suffered no prejudice"). 
 
The D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit have both, after Olano, 
acknowledged that constructive amendments are per se reversible under 
harmless error review, but have nevertheless placed the burden on the 
defendant to show that the constructive amendment was prejudicial 
under plain error analysis. See United States v. Lawton, 995 F.2d 290, 
294 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Vebeliunas, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 
8727, at *22 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 1996) (deciding, based on defendant's 
concession, that he could prevail under the plain error standard only by 
demonstrating that he was prejudiced). While the Fifth Circuit maintains 
a per se reversal rule for constructive amendments in the harmless error 
context, it has not addressed whether the same rule applies under plain 
error review because, citing concerns about defendant "sandbagging," it 
concluded that it would exercise its discretion not to reverse a 
conviction 
even if all four prongs of the plain error test were met. See United 
States 
v. Reyes, 102 F.3d 1361, 1365 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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specific showing of prejudice." Id. at 285 (quoting Olano, 
507 U.S. at 735). We also noted that under Olano , "there 
may be a special category of forfeited errors that can be 
corrected `regardless of their effect on the outcome,' " and 
stated our assumption that this category is coextensive 
with the category of "structural" constitutional errors. Id. at 
285 & n.6 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 735). We concluded 
that "Olano dictates that when a defendant fails to object[,] 
. . . his claim on appeal is reviewed for plain error -- which 
requires the defendant to make a specific showing of 
prejudice, unless he can show that the error should be 
presumed prejudicial, or that the error belongs in a special 
category of errors that should be corrected regardless of 
prejudice (i.e., the category of structural errors)." Id. at 285. 
 
Adams addressed a denial of the right of allocution (i.e., 
the right of a criminal defendant to make a statement prior 
to sentencing). Adams did not reach the issue whether the 
denial of the right of allocution constituted structural error; 
rather it held that it fell into the other category of errors 
that should be presumed prejudicial. The question in this 
case, therefore, is whether constructive amendments fall 
into either of the two exceptions to the general rule that a 
defendant must demonstrate prejudice under plain error 
review. 
 
We turn first to the question whether constructive 
amendments fall into Olano's category of"those errors that 
should be presumed prejudicial if the defendant cannot 
make a specific showing of prejudice." Olano , 507 U.S. at 
735. In Adams, we found that the denial of a defendant's 
constitutional right of allocution falls within Olano's 
category of "errors that should be presumed prejudicial" in 
the plain error context. 252 F.3d at 287 (quoting Olano, 
507 U.S. at 735) (internal quotation marks omitted). We 
noted that "[g]iven the nature of the right[of allocution] and 
the difficulty of proving prejudice from its violation, we 
conclude that we should presume prejudice when a 
defendant shows a violation of the right and the 
opportunity for such a violation to have played a role in the 
district court's sentencing decision." Id. at 287. 
 
Like a denial of the right of allocution, a constructive 
amendment also violates a basic right of criminal 
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defendants, the grand jury guarantee of the Fifth 
Amendment. We follow the holding of Adams that some 
serious errors should be presumed prejudicial in the plain 
error context even if they do not constitute structural errors 
and find that constructive amendments fall into that  
category.8 Similar to the plight of a defendant who is denied 
the right of allocution, it is very difficult for a defendant to 
prove prejudice resulting from most constructive 
amendments to an indictment. In the present case, for 
example, it is nearly impossible for Syme to demonstrate 
that he was convicted on count 25 based on the 
Pennsylvania rate theory, rather than on one of the other 
theories of guilt pleaded in that count (i.e., that the 
constructive amendment altered the outcome on that 
count), even though there is a substantial possibility that 
he was convicted based on the Pennsylvania rate theory. As 
Syme points out, the District Court identified the 
Pennsylvania rate theory as the "crux" of the government's 
case. Therefore, we will apply in the plain error context a 
rebuttable presumption that constructive amendments are 
prejudicial (and thus that they satisfy the third prong of 
plain error review).9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We note that our holding today is narrower than the rule that Adams 
applied because constructive amendments are constitutional errors that 
are of sufficient magnitude that they cannot be dismissed as harmless 
when a defendant objects to them in the district court. See Stirone, 361 
U.S. at 217; Castro, 776 F.2d at 1121-22. By contrast, the right of 
allocution is not grounded in the Constitution. See Adams, 252 F.3d at 
288. 
 
9. We recognize that the presumption that we apply, like any exception 
to the general rule that the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate 
all of the prongs of the plain error test, may increase the likelihood of 
defendants "sandbagging," i.e., failing to object to an error at the trial 
level in order to keep an issue for appeal as insurance in the event they 
are convicted. The Fifth Circuit cited its concerns about sandbagging as 
the reason for its refusal to notice plain error in the constructive 
amendment context. See Reyes, 102 F.3d at 1365. There are, however, 
two reasons why the potential instances of sandbagging arising from the 
presumption that we apply today will be limited. First, constructive 
amendments are a narrowly defined category of errors, which arise 
relatively infrequently. The presumption of prejudice under plain error 
analysis does not extend to the more frequently encountered category of 
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Applying the rule that constructive amendments are 
presumptively prejudicial under plain error review to the 
present case, we must determine whether the government 
has effectively rebutted the presumption that the 
constructive amendment was prejudicial. The government 
argues that the pattern of counts on which the jury 
convicted Syme reveals that it did not rely on the District 
Court's erroneous instructions, and that Syme was 
therefore not prejudiced by the constructive amendment. 
The jury convicted Syme on all of the counts in the 18-29 
range in which the Pennsylvania rate theory was alleged in 
the chart accompanying the indictment but found him not 
guilty on all but one of the counts in which the 
Pennsylvania rate theory was not alleged. This pattern 
holds for all of the counts in this range except for count 25, 
in which the Pennsylvania rate theory was not alleged, but 
on which the jury convicted Syme. Thus, the government 
contends that the jury actually relied on the chart 
accompanying the indictment rather than the District 
Court's instructions and that Syme therefore could not 
have been prejudiced by the erroneous jury instructions. 
 
We find this argument unconvincing. We do not believe 
that the "pattern of convictions" is sufficient to support the 
conclusion that the government urges us to draw about the 
jury's motivations, i.e., that it relied on the chart and 
ignored the Court's instructions. As a rule, we presume the 
opposite -- that the jury follows a district court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
variances from an indictment, which may be dismissed as harmless even 
when properly objected to at trial. See, e.g. , Castro, 776 F.2d at 1121 & 
n.1 (distinguishing constructive amendments from variances). Second, 
even with a presumption of prejudice in plain error analysis of 
constructive amendments, defendants who may be considering a 
sandbagging strategy still risk that an appellate court will exercise its 
discretion to refuse to notice plain error if the defendant fails to 
object 
to the error at the trial level. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors 
or 
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were 
not brought to the attention of the court.") (emphasis added); see also 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (noting that appellate courts are not required to 
notice plain error, but may do so at their discretion). Appellate courts 
will be particularly reluctant to notice a constructive amendment as 
plain error if they suspect that the defendant was sandbagging. 
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instructions. See, e.g., Jermyn v. Horn , 266 F.3d 257, 312 
(3d Cir. 2001). We therefore conclude that the government 
has not rebutted the presumption that the constructive 
amendment was prejudicial. 
 
Applying a presumption of prejudice to our plain error 
review of this constructive amendment, we conclude that 
the constructive amendment to count 25 affected Syme's 
substantial rights.10 Leaving this error uncorrected would 
seriously affect the fairness and integrity of the proceeding. 
See Olano, 507 U.S. at 736. We will therefore exercise our 
discretion to vacate Syme's conviction on count 25 of the 
superseding indictment and remand for a new trial on that 
count. 
 
D. Was the Evidence Presented Sufficient for 
the Jury to Convict Syme Based on the 
"Medical Necessity" Theory of Fraud for 
Count 25? 
 
Syme challenges the "medical necessity" theory of fraud 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Because we hold that constructive amendments are presumptively 
prejudicial under plain error review, and that the government cannot 
rebut that presumption in this case, we need not address the question 
whether constructive amendments are structural errors (in which case 
we assume they would constitute per se reversible error even under plain 
error review). We note, however, that it is doubtful that constructive 
amendments are structural errors as the Supreme Court has defined 
that category. In its two most recent structural error cases, the Court 
listed the categories of errors that it has found to be structural. See 
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (noting that the 
Court has "found structural errors only in a very limited class of cases") 
(citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (erroneous reasonable- 
doubt instruction to jury); Vasquez v. Hillery , 474 U.S. 254 (1986) 
(unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of defendant's race); Waller v. 
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (the right to a public trial); McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (the right to self-representation at trial); 
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (a total deprivation of the right 
to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (lack of an impartial 
trial judge)); see also Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) 
(citing 
the same cases). Notably, neither Johnson nor Neder cited Stirone or 
listed constructive amendments as one of the narrow class of recognized 
structural errors. 
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in several of the fraud and False Claims Act counts for 
which he was convicted. As we explained above, we need 
not reach the question whether the evidence was sufficient 
to support the "medical necessity" theory on all of the 
counts in which it was alleged because each count 
contained an alternative theory of fraud that Syme does not 
challenge on this appeal. Therefore, under the rule from 
United States v. Griffin, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), we affirm the 
convictions, assuming that they rested on the factually 
supported ground. However, because we reverse count 25 
and remand for a new trial thereon, we must consider 
Syme's challenge to the factual sufficiency of the"medical 
necessity" theory of fraud pleaded in that count. 
 
Citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), Syme 
contends that if we find that there was not sufficient 
evidence presented at trial to support the medical necessity 
theory as it applies to count 25, we must exclude it from 
the new trial that we order on this count. Syme's trial 
counsel moved to dismiss the case for insufficient evidence 
at the close of the government's case, thus preserving the 
issue for appeal. We will review Syme's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the "medical 
necessity" theory of fraud in count 25 under the harmless 
error standard. See Fed R. Crim. P. 52(a). 
 
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's 
verdict is challenged, "we must view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the government and must sustain 
the jury's verdict if a reasonable jury believing the 
government's evidence could find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the government proved all the elements of the 
offense." United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 149 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 
163 (3d Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted). In fact, "only when the record contains 
no evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, from which 
the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may 
an appellate court overturn the verdict." United States v. 
Anderson, 108 F.3d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United 
States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1989)) 
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
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Count 25 refers to an August 3, 1994 ambulance trip in 
which NCC transported 80-year-old patient Ruth Graham. 
Dr. Leaser, the government's expert medical witness, 
testified that, based on his review of Graham's medical files, 
it was his opinion that it was not necessary to transport 
Graham by ambulance. Leaser based his opinion that 
ambulance transport was not necessary for Graham largely 
on notes made by the medical personnel at the nursing 
home where Graham lived, which indicated that she was 
ambulatory and could sit up unassisted. He cited a record 
that stated that as of January 1994, Graham was able to 
ambulate without assistance. He also noted that Graham's 
records indicated that in late March 1994, she was able to 
sit up without assistance and participate in an 
occupational therapy session. 
 
But the government asked Leaser only if he had reviewed 
"the medical records for Graham for [the] dates of service 
January 20th, 1994 and March 17th, 1994." Leaser did not 
mention consulting any medical evidence recorded after 
March 1994, and his testimony suggests that he did not 
review Graham's medical files for dates after March 1994. 
Leaser noted that, in addition to Graham's medical records 
near the January 20, 1994 and March 17, 1994 ambulance 
trips, he "also looked at one other date . . . [on which] there 
was an ambulance transport . . . 2/16/94." (emphasis 
added). However, Graham's health could have deteriorated 
during the more than four months that passed between the 
date of the last medical record upon which Leaser relied 
and the August 3, 1994 ambulance trip in question. 
Therefore, although we "view the evidence and the 
inferences logically deducible therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the government," McNeill, 887 F.2d at 450, we 
conclude that due to the government's failure to put forth 
any evidence more current than March 1994, no reasonable 
jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Graham's 
August 3, 1994 ambulance trip was not medically 
necessary. 
 
Because we conclude that the government presented 
insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have convicted 
Syme on count 25 based on the "medical necessity" theory 
in the first trial, we must address the question whether to 
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allow the government to retry that theory on remand, or to 
limit the remand exclusively to the "treatment" theory 
(which Syme does not challenge). Syme argues that Burks 
instructs this court not to allow the government to retry a 
theory on which the government presented insufficient 
evidence the first time around. In Burks, the Supreme 
Court considered whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution bars an appellate court that reverses 
a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence presented at 
trial from remanding the count of conviction for a new trial. 
The court of appeals in Burks (1) found that at trial the 
"Government had failed to come forward with sufficient 
proof of petitioner's capacity to be responsible for criminal 
acts," (2) held that the district court should have entered a 
judgment of acquittal in the first instance, and (3) 
remanded the case for a new trial. 437 U.S. at 10-11. The 
sole issue before the Supreme Court was whether it is 
proper for an appeals court to remand a case for a new trial 
after finding that the verdict was insufficiently supported by 
the evidence presented at trial. 
 
The Court found that it is not proper, holding that the 
"Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the 
purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to 
supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first 
proceeding." Id. at 11. The Court has stated that this 
principle, which "prevents the State from honing its trial 
strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive 
attempts at conviction," lies "at the core of the Clause's 
protections." Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982). While 
Burks held that it was improper to order retrial of a whole 
count that the evidence was insufficient to support, we see 
no reason why the Double Jeopardy Clause would not also 
bar retrial on an alternative theory of guilt that the evidence 
was insufficient to support in a single count of conviction. 
The government does not argue that this error was 
harmless. Therefore, we will restrict the scope of the new 
trial on count 25 to the "treatment" theory, excluding both 
the Pennsylvania rate theory (because it was not alleged in 
the indictment), and the "medical necessity" theory 
(because the government presented insufficient evidence to 
support it in the first trial). 
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IV. Upward Adjustment for "Sophisticated Means" 
under the Sentencing Guidelines 
 
Syme argues that the District Court violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause by applying a two-level sentence enhancement 
for the commission of fraud by "sophisticated means" 
pursuant to S 2F1.1(b)(5)(c) (1998) of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines. Because Syme raises this objection 
for the first time on appeal, we review the claim under the 
plain error standard. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see also 
supra note 4. 
 
The "sophisticated means" enhancement did not become 
effective until November 1, 1998, more than a year after the 
last conduct charged in the indictment. We have held that 
"[a]s a general rule, sentencing courts must apply the 
guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, not at the 
time of the crime," but that where, as here,"such 
retroactivity results in harsher penalties, Ex Post Facto 
Clause problems arise, and courts must apply the earlier 
version." United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 
1991); see also U.S.S.G. S 1b1.11(b) (2001) ("If the court 
determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on 
the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the 
ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution, the 
court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date 
that the offense of conviction was committed."). 
 
The government concedes that the first two prongs of 
plain error review are met, i.e., that the District Court erred 
by applying the "sophisticated means" enhancement, and 
that this error was clear. The government challenges the 
third prong of the plain error standard, however, 
contending that Syme's substantial rights were not 
prejudiced by the error because the range of possible 
sentences under the correct sentencing level (level 19, 
which calls for a sentence of 30-37 months) overlaps with 
the range of sentences under the erroneous sentencing level 
(level 21, which yields a sentence of 37-46 months). 
However, in United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 
2001), we held that under plain error review, "an error in 
application of the Guidelines that results in use of a higher 
sentencing range should be presumed to affect the 
defendant's substantial rights." Id. at 207. As does this 
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case, Knight addressed the situation where the erroneous 
sentencing range overlapped with the correct sentencing 
range. The government has failed to rebut this presumption 
of prejudice. We conclude that this error too "seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings" to be left uncorrected. United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (internal quotation marks 
and alternation omitted). Therefore, we will vacate Syme's 
sentence and remand to the District Court with 
instructions to sentence Syme without applying the 
"sophisticated means" enhancement. 
 
V. Did the Restitution Order Violate Apprendi? 
 
The District Court ordered Syme to pay $100,000 in 
restitution to the HCFA (a $300,000 restitution order less a 
$200,000 credit) pursuant to the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. S 3663. Syme contends 
that the restitution order violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000). Syme failed to raise this objection in 
the District Court, and therefore we review for plain error. 
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see also supra note 4. 
 
The operative rule from Apprendi is as follows: "Other 
than the fact of prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490. We consider 
restitution orders made pursuant to criminal convictions to 
be criminal penalties. United States v. Edwards , 162 F.3d 
87, 91 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that restitution ordered 
under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 
U.S.C. S 3663A, constitutes punishment for the purpose of 
Ex Post Facto Clause analysis); United States v. Sleight, 808 
F.2d 1012, 1020 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that under the 
Federal Probation Act, restitution "remains inherently a 
criminal penalty"); United States v. Palma , 760 F.2d 475, 
479 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a restitution ordered under 
the VWPA is a criminal penalty). We therefore hold that 
restitution ordered under 18 U.S.C. S 3663 constitutes "the 
penalty for a crime" within the meaning of Apprendi. The 
jury in this case was not charged with finding the amount 
of restitution owed to the HCFA. Therefore, the question is 
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whether the District Court's restitution order increased 
beyond the statutory maximum the penalties that Syme 
faced. If so, the order violated Apprendi. 
 
Section 3663(a)(1)(A) of the VWPA provides: "The court, 
when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under 
this title, . . . may order, in addition to or, in the case of 
misdemeanor, in lieu of any other penalty authorized by 
law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim of 
such offense . . . ." 18 U.S.C. S 3663(a)(1)(A) (emphasis 
added). The highlighted language specifically indicates that 
restitution orders are penalties that a district court may 
impose when sentencing a defendant for any offense under 
title 18. Restitution orders have long been treated as part of 
the sentence for the offense of conviction, and not, as Syme 
appears to contend, separate enhancements to the 
underlying offense. See, e.g., Sleight , 808 F.2d at 1020 
(holding that "restitution . . . is imposed as a part of 
sentencing"); Palma, 760 F.2d at 479 (noting that the 
legislative history of the VWPA "amply demonstrates that 
Congress intended restitution to be an integral part of the 
sentencing process"). 
 
Therefore, because the language of section 3663 
specifically applies that section to all offenses defined in 
title 18, and because it has been the traditional practice of 
district courts to include restitution as part of the sentence 
for the offense of conviction, we think that the appropriate 
place to look for the statutory maximum as that term 
applies in the Apprendi context, is the restitution statute 
itself. But section 3663 does not specify a maximum 
amount of restitution that a court may order. The statute 
provides guidelines that a sentencing judge may use to 
determine the amount of restitution, but does not prescribe 
a maximum amount. The Apprendi rule therefore does not 
apply to restitution orders made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3663, because Apprendi applies only to criminal penalties 
that increase a defendant's sentence "beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum." 530 U.S. at 490. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will vacate Syme's False 
Claims Act conviction on count 25 of the superseding 
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indictment and remand that count for a new trial based 
only on the "treatment" theory of fraud. We will also vacate 
the sentence imposed by the District Court and remand for 
resentencing with instructions not to apply the 
"sophisticated means" enhancement of S 2F1.1(b)(5)(c) 
(1998) of the Sentencing Guidelines. In all other respects, 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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